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SUPREMACY ®F THE
CANADIAN CHARTER ®F RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
PETER W. HOGG*
Toronto

The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms is Part 1 of the Constitution Act,
1982, which is part of the "Constitution ofCanada" . By virtue ofsection 52(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982, the Constitution of Canada is "the supreme law of
Canada", and inconsistent laws enacted by the Parliament or a Legislature are of
noforce or effect . In this article the writer concludes that the Constitution Act,
1982, including PartI (the Charter) and section 52(1) (the supremacy clause), has
been validly enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament, and has been effectively
entrenched so that its provisions can only .be amended by the new amending
procedures laid down by Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés constitue la Partie I de la Loi
constitutionnelle de 1982, elle-même incorporée à la "Constitution du Canada" .
En vertu de l'article 52(1) de laLoi constitutionnelle, la Constitution représente la
"loi suprême du Canada", et toute loi promulguée par le Parlement ou par une
législature provinciale, incompatible avec la Constitution, est inopérante. Dans
cet article, l'auteur conclut que la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, comprenant la
Partie I (Charte).et l'article 52(1) (primauté), a été validement promulguée par le
Parlement du Royaume-Uni, et a été effectivement enchâssée dans la Constitution,
de sorte que ses dispositions -ne peuvent être amendées que par la nouvelle
procédure de modification énoncée à la Partie V de ladite loi .
Introduction

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' is part of "the supreme law
of Canada" and therefore overrides any federal or provincial statute which
is inconsistent with a provision of the Charter. This result is stipulated by
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, 2 which provides :
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to theextent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect .

The "Constitution of Canada", to which supremacy is accorded by section
52(l), is defined in section 52(2) as including "this Act", which means the
Constitution Act, 1982, of which Part I (sections 1-34) is the Charter.
* PeterW. Hogg, Q.C ., of the Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I
am grateful to my colleague, Brian Slattery, whoread a draftversionof this article andmade
useful suggestions for its improvement.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as "the
Charter") is Part I (ss .1-34) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which is Schedule B of the
Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U .K .) .
2 Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, 1982, c . 11 (U .K .),
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The Charter makes clear, in section 32(1), that its provisions apply to
the federal Parliament and to the legislature of each province . 3 By virtue of
the supremacy clause (section 52(l)), therefore, the Charter constitutes a
set of new limitations on the powers of the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures . Any statute which transgresses one of the new limitations
is rendered "of no force or effect" by the supremacy clause . 5
To be sure, the Charter, by section 33, permits the Parliament or a
legislature to exempt a statute from some of the provisions of the Charter by
inserting in the statute a "notwithstanding clause", that is, an express
declaration that the Act is to operate notwithstanding certain provisions of
the Charter (which must be specified in the declaration) . To a degree,
section 33 detracts from the supremacy of the Charter-but only to a
degree . In the first place, section 33 is itself a restriction on legislative
power, imposing as it does the "manner and form" requirement of the
inclusion of a notwithstanding clause for statutes seeking exemption from
certain provisions of the Charter, and (by subsections (3) to (5) of section
33) requiring also that the notwithstanding clause be re-enacted every five
years. Nor are such requirements merely trivial since the enactment or
re-enactment of a statute which includes a notwithstanding clause will
obviously attract public attention and arouse political opposition . Secondly, section 33 does not extend to all of the provisions of the Charter, only to
3 This article will not explore the question of the extent to which the Charter applies to
matters other than statutes . For more detailed analysis of s . 32, see Hogg, Canada Act 1982
Annotated (1982), pp . 75-78;Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin (eds), Canadian Charterof Rights
and Freedoms : Commentary (1982), ch . 3 (Swinton) .
4 Before the coming into force of theConstitution Act, 1982 the federal Parliament and
the provincial Legislatures were subject to the limitations imposed by the constitutional
provisions which distribute legislative powers between the two levels of government,
making Canada a "federal" state. As well, there were a few other limitations on legislative
power, for example, those contained in ss 93, 96-98, 99, 121, 125 and 133 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict ., c. 3 as am . Judicial review was therefore a wellestablished part of the Canadian legal system : see following note . But there was no bill of
rights comparable in scope to that contained in the amendments to the constitution of the
United States . The new Charter, by adding a new set of guarantees of civil liberties, will
extend the scope of judicial review by adding a further set of grounds upon which a statute
could be held to be invalid.
5 The supremacy clause of s. 52(1) also becomes applicable to the limits on legislative
power which date back to before 1982, because those limits are all contained in instruments
which form part of the "Constitution of Canada" (a term defined in s. 52(2)) to which
supremacy is accorded by s. 52(1) . Before 1982 there was no supremacy clause, but the
courts held nonetheless that the provisions of the British North America Acts (1867, 30-31
Vict ., c. 3 as am ., now renamed the Constitution Acts) were supreme, and that the courts
had the power of judicial review, that is, the power to hold a statute invalid which
transgressed a constitutional limitation on the power of the enacting legislative body : See
Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada (1968), ch . 1 ; Hogg, Constitutional Law
of Canada (1977), pp . 42-48.
6 For more detailed analysis of s . 33, see Hogg ., op . cit., footnote 3, pp . 78-81 ;
Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin (eds .), op . cit., footnote 3, pp . 70-73 (Marx) .
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section 2 and sections 7 to 15 . The remaining provisions of the Charter
cannot be turned . aside by the enactment of a notwithstanding clause; and
those remaining provisions of the Charter include the "democratic rights"
of sections 3 to 5, the "mobility rights" of section 6, the "language rights"
of sections 16 to 23, and the sexual equality right of section 28 . I conclude,
therefore, that section 33, with its provision for a notwithstanding clause,
does not in principle contradict the proposition that the Charter is supreme
over ordinary legislation and constitutes a new set of limitations on the
powers of the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures .
The question to be investigated in this article is whether the "supremacy clause" of section 52(l) is a legally effective limitation on the powers
of the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures . This question requires
answers to a progression of three questions . (1) Has the Constitution Act,
1982 (which includes both the Charter and the supremacy clause) been
validly enacted for Canada by the United Kingdom Parliament? (2) Has
the Constitution Act, 1982 been effectively "entrenched" so that it cannot
be repealed or amended except in compliance with the amending procedures prescribed by Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982? (3) Is the
supremacy clause itself valid and effective in rendering statutes which are
inconsistent with the Constitution of Canada (including the Charter) of no
force or effect? I hasten to reassure the reader that I conclude that affirmative answers must be givento all three questions. I do not conclude that our
new constitution is unconstitutional!
I. Validity of Constitution Act, 1982 .
The Constitution Act, 1982 was .never enacted by any legislative body in
Canada .? It consists of a schedule (Schedule B) to the Canada Act 1982,8 a
statute enacted on March 29th, 1982 by the United Kingdom Parliament .9
The Canada Act 1982, by section l , purports to "have the force of law in
Canada", and the Act recites in the preamble that "Canada has requested
and consented to the enactment of [the Act]" . 1° The question whether the
Constitution Act, 1982 has been validly enacted for Canada is therefore a
question about the legislative power over Canada of the United Kingdom
Parliament . t t laid the United Kingdom Parliament have the power to enact
7 Its terms were however approved by a joint resolution of the Senate and House of
Commons of the Parliament of Canada, which requested the enactment by the United
Kingdom Parliament of the Canada Act 1982 and its schedule, the Constitution Act, 1982 .
The resolution waspassed by the Canadian House of Commons on December 2nd, 1981 and
by the Canadian Senate on December 8th, 1981 .
8 Supra, footnote 1.
9 The Canada Act received royal assent and came into force on March 29th, 1982 . The
coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982 was, by s. 58, postponed to "a day to be
fixed by proclamation", and that day was fixed as April 17th, 1982 .
i° Supra, footnote 7.
11 Although this is a question about the powerof the United Kingdom Parliament, it is
a question about its power over Canada, and that is a question of Canadian law which can
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for Canada the Canada Act 1982 (including Schedule B, the Constitution
Act, 1982)? This question relates to the validity not only of the Charter,
which is Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the supremacy clause,
which is section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, but also of all of the
other provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982, including the native rights
guarantee (Part 1I), the amending procedures (Part V) and the natural
resources clause (Part VI) .
The Statute of Westminster, 1931 I' was enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament to remove some of the vestiges of colonial status which
still clung inappropriately to Canada and the other self-governing
Dominions" of the British Empire (or Commonwealth as it was by 1931
starting to be called). The Statute of Westminster, by section 2, conferred
on each Dominion the power to amend or repeal imperial statutes 14 extending to that Dominion . However, the Statute of Westminster did not adopt
the straightforward course of abrogating the legislative power over the
Dominions of the United Kingdom Parliament, because in 1931 the dominant theory among British and Dominion constitutional lawyers was that a
sovereign parliament could not legally limit its powers .' 5 In the case of
only be determined conclusively by Canadian courts . In Manuel v. A.-G., High Court of
Justice, Chancery Division, May 7th, 1982, to be reported in Canadian Rights Reporter, the
validity of the Canada Act 1982 and its schedule the Constitution Act, 1982 was challenged
by various Indian bands in the English courts . Megarry V . C. dismissedthe challenge on the
simple basis that "once an instrument is recognized as being an Act of Parliament, no
English court can refuse to obey it or question its validity" . His lordship held that his
decision would have been the same even if an Act of Parliament purported to apply in "a
foreign state which has neverbeen British" . He said : "No doubt the Act would normally be
ignored by the foreign state and would not be enforced by it, but that would not invalidate
the Act in this country." These dicta emphasize that the English court will view the issue
quite differently from the court of the country where the Actpurports to dpply, andthe latter
court will regard the attitude of the English court as inconclusive if not totally irrelevant.
This point is briefly elaborated in Hogg, Comment, (1982), 60 Can. Bar Rev. 307, at p.
329, and in more detail in Slattery, The Independence of Canada (1982), to be published in
the Supreme Court Law Review .
'Z U.K ., 22 Geo. V, c. 4; R.S .C . 1970, Appendix II, No . 26 . The leading work on the
Statute of Westminster is Wheare, The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status (5th
ed ., 1953), of which ch . 5 (The Statute and the United Kingdom Parliament) and ch . 6 (The
Statute and the Legal Status of Canada) are especially useful with respect to Canada .
'3
The term "Dominion" was defined in s. 1 of the Statute of Westminster as meaning
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland .
" Imperial statutes were statutes enactedby the United Kingdom Parliament for some
part of the British Empire (or Commonwealth), although they were sometimes applicable
within the United Kingdom itself as well . Before the Statute of Westminster they constituted a limitation on the powers of the legislative assemblies of the Dominions because an
imperial statute could be amended or repealed only by the United Kingdom Parliament and
anylaw enacted by a Dominion legislative assembly was void to the extent of inconsistency
with an imperial statute .
!5 Wheare, Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (1960), p. 25 . Since the
second world war expert opinion has shifted on this point: see, e.g ., de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (3rd . ed ., 1977), p. 76 ; and most of the former British colonies
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Canada, there was in 1931 a second, more practicalreason forthe preservation ofthe legislative authority of the United Kingdom Parliament, and that
was the fact that the British North America Act lacked special procedures
for its amendment within Canada. So long as that disability remained, it
was necessary that the United Kingdom Parliament retain its power to
amend at least the British North America Act . For these two reasons the
Statute of Westminster, by sections 4 and 7(1), preserved the legislative
authority over Canada of the United Kingdom Parliament . 16,
Canada (like the other Dominions) was protected from future exercises of imperial legislative power by a convention which was adopted by
the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and all of the Dominions at the
imperial conference of 1930 . The convention so adopted was that the
United Kingdom Parliament would not enact a statute extending to a
Dominion "otherwise than at. the request and with the consent of that
Dominion" . This convention was not actually enacted into law by the
Statute of Westminster, but it was recited in the preamble to the Statute .
However, the convention was supplemented-by section 4 of the Statute of
Westminster. Section 4 provided that any statute of the United Kingdom
Parliament extending to a Dominion must include an express declaration
"that the Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof" . This latter statutory requirement applied to statutes extending to
Canada as well as to each of the other Dominions, but it did not apply to
statutes amending the British North America Act, because section 7(1) of
the Statute provided that "nothing in this Act" was to apply to "the repeal,
amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to
1930" . ®f course, the convention, which existed outside the Statute of
Westminster, did apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the
British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930 . Therefore, United Kingdom
statutes amending the British North America Acts were required by convention to be enacted only at the request and with the consent of Canada,
but were not required by statute to include an express declaration that the
request and consent had been obtained .'$
which have achieved independence after the second world war have sought and obtained in
their independence statutes an abdication by the United Kingdom Parliament of legislative
power over the newly-independent country. The new theory that such an abdication is
legally effective also underlies s. 2 of the Canada Act 1982 which constitutes an abdication
by the United Kingdom Parliament of its authority over Canada .
le With the enactment of s. 2 of the Canada Act 1982 (see previous footnote), ss 4 and
7(1) of the Statute of Westminster could be repealed for Canada, and they were repealed by
s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1982 : see schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, item 17 .
17
The preamble states : "And whereas it is in accord with the established constitutional position that no law hereafter made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall
extend to anyof the said Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion otherwise than at the
request and with the consent of that Dominion :"
18
This article will not discuss the difficult and much debated question of the effect of a
statute enacted forCanada in breach of either the convention or s. 4 (where it is applicable) .
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In Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution (1981) 19 the
Supreme Court of Canada, by a seven-judge majority (Laskin C.J ., Dickson, Beetz, Estey, McIntyre. Chouinard and Lamer JJ.; Martland and
RitchieJJ. dissenting), afterfirst declaring that "the authority of the British
Parliament or its practices and conventions are not matters upon which this
Court would pronounce" ,2° went on to say that the United Kingdom
Parliament's authority over Canada is "untrammelled" ,21 it was "untouched" by the Statute of Westminster, 22 it remains "omnipotent' 23
"unimpaired"' and" undiminished" .25 If their lordships intended to say
that the power over Canada of the United Kingdom Parliament was subject
to no limits whatsoever, these statements were in my view wrong, and in
any event went far beyond what was necessary to answer the questions
posed in the reference. The holding that was necessary to answer the
questions posed on the reference was that the United Kingdom Parliament,
acting at the request and with the consent of the two houses of the
Parliament of Canada, had the legal authority to enact the Canada Act
1982 . The case certainly stands for that proposition.'-'
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada inReference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution also stands for the proposition that the
consent of the provinces was not required by law for the enactment of the
Canada Act 1982 . At the time when the Supreme Court of Canada rendered
its decision (September 1981), only two provinces supported the federal
proposals for constitutional change . The court held that the requirement of
a "substantial degree" or a "substantial measure' " ofprovincial consent, 28
while it was not satisfied by only two provinces out of ten, was a requireThere is Privy Council authority for the position that neither the convention (Madzinibamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 A .C. 645, at p. 723) nor s. 4 (British Coal Corporation v.
The King, [1935[ A. C. 500, at p. 520) is strictly binding on the United Kingdom Parliament . Butneither of these holdings is free from doubt : see, e.g ., re disregard of convention,
Hogg, op . cit., footnote 11, at pp . 326, 330, and re disregard of s . 4, de Smith, op . cit.,
footnote 15, pp . 74-75.
19
[19811 1 S .C .R . 753.
20
Ibid ., at p. 774.
21 Ibid., at p. 790.
22 Ibid ., at p. 794.
23
Ibid . , at p. 797.
24 Ibid ., at p. 799.
25
Ibid ., at p. 801 .
26
Hogg, op . cit. , footnote 11, at p. 330.
'-7 The resolution passed in December 1981 by the Senate and House of Commons of
the Parliament of Canada which formed the basis of the final versionof the Canada Act 1982
(supra, footnote 7) differed in some respects from the resolution passed in April 1981 which
was the subject of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada . But the changes were not
material to the answer to the question of law posed to the court. It is clear that the decision is
equally applicable to the final form of the constitutional resolution .
28 Supra, footnote 19, at p. 905.
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ment of convention only, not of law . As the sevenjudge majority said:
"The law knows nothing of provincial consent, either to aresolution of the
federal Houses or as a condition to the exercise of United Kingdom
legislative power . "29
After the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada had been rendered,
a federal-provincial agreement was arrived at which raised the level of
provincial support for a (somewhat altered) constitutional resolution from
two provinces to nine. It was by no means clear that this new agreement
satisfied the court's requirement of a "substantial measure" of provincial
consent since the dissenting province was Quebec . 30 That question was
submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada on a reference directed by the
Quebec government, and the court held that the requisite substantial
measure of provincial consent, had been achieved despite Quebec's
dissent . 3 t In any event, even if the decision had gone the other way, the
absence of Quebec's consent would only have been a breach of
convention, 32 and thus devoid of legal consequences . 33 Therefore, the
absence of Quebec's consent to the resolution proposing the enactment of
the Canada Act 1982 could not affect the legal authority of the United
Kingdom Parliament to enact the Act.
Moving from the realm of convention to that of law, it will be recalled
that section 4 of the Statute of Westminster imposed the legal requirement
that a statute of the United Kingdom Parliament which extended to Canada
must contain an express declaration that Canada has "requested, and
consented to" the enactment of the statute . It will also be recalled that, by
virtue ofsection 7(1) ofthe Statute of Westminster, this express declaration
is not required in a United Kingdom statute which can be characterized as
coming within the phrase "the repeal, amendment or alteration of the
British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930" . Probably, the provisions of
the Canada Act 1982 come within this phrase,34 and if so there is no
requirement of an express declaration . Nevertheless, the Canada Act 1982
includes in its preamble an express declaration that "Canada has requested
29

Ibid ., at p. 807.

The question was whether the court's test was satisfied merely by a high numerical
measure of consent, (nine out of ten), or whether the agreement should also reflect the
principle of duality (implying the protection of the powers of the only predominantly
French-speaking province) .
31 A .-G. Que . v. A.-G. Can., Supreme Court of Canada decision of December 6th,
1982, not yet reported .
32
The question posed by the Quebec government asked only whether a "convention"
had been broken, and the court addressed only that question .
33 Supra, footnote
19, at p. 880.
34 Only a few provisions of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930 are directly
repealed or amended by the schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, but it seems reasonable
to treat the entire set of provisions of the Canada Act 1982 and the Constitution Act, 1982 as
an "alteration" of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930.
30
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and consented to the enactment of [the Act] " . The cautious inclusion of the
express declaration makes clear that, just in case any provision of the
Canada Act 1982, including its schedule, the Constitution Act, 1982, is not
a "repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts,
1867 to 1930", the provision has been enacted in compliance with section
4 of the Statute of Westminster. 35
I conclude that the United Kingdom Parliament had the power to enact
into Canadian law the Canada Act 1982 and its schedule, the Constitution
Act, 1982 ; and that they were validly enacted into Canadian law .
II . Entrenchment of Constitution Act, 1982 .
Assuming that I am right that the Canada Act 1982, and its schedule, the
Constitution Act, 1982, have been validly enacted into Canadian law, the
question remains: have they been effectively entrenched?
Section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982 purports to entrench all of
the provisions of the "Constitution of Canada", a phrase which is defined
in section 52(2) as including the Canada Act 1982 and the Constitution Act,
1982 . Section 52(3) provides that amendments to the Constitution of
Canada may be made "only in accordance with the authority contained in
the Constitution of Canada" . That is, of course, a reference to the amending procedures of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 . Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982 prescribes the procedures for amending the Constitution of Canada . All of its provisions, except for sections 44 and 45,
prescribe a more elaborate procedure than the ordinary legislative process.
The answer to the question whether the Constitution Act, 1982 is
effectively entrenched depends upon whether section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is itself immune from ordinary legislative change . I have
already shown that section 52(3), in common with all the other provisions
enacted by the Canada Act 1982, is a valid law for Canada . But the question
remains whether sections 2(2) and 7(2) of the Statute of Westminster would
authorize the federal Parliament or a provincial legislature to repeal or
amend section 52(3) . Section 2(2) of the Statute of Westminster confers on
the Parliament of a Dominion (including the Parliament of Canada) "the
power to repeal or amend" any "existing or future Act of Parliament of the
United Kingdom" which is part of the law of Canada . Section 7(2) of the
Statute of Westminster confers the same power on the legislatures of the
Canadian provinces. What is to stop the federal Parliament or a provincial
legislature from repealing or amending section 52(3) of the Constitution
Act, 1982?
35
As noted, supra, footnote 18, it is arguable, on the basis of British Coal Corporation v. The King, [1935[ A.C . 500, at p. 520, that, even if s. 4 had not been complied with,
the validity of the Canada Act 1982 and its schedule, the Constitution Act, 1982, wouldnot
have been affected .
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One reason why the federal Parliament or a provincial legislature
cannot repeal or amend section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is to be
found within the Statute of Westminster itself. The powers conferred by
sections 2(2) and 7(2) of the Statute of Westminster, to repeal or amend a
statute of the United Kingdom Parliament extending to Canada, are expressly restricted by section 7(3) of the Statute of Westminster to "the
enactment of laws in relation to matters within the competence of the
Parliament of Canada or of any of the legislatures of the Provinces respectively" . The reference to "competence" must mean competence at any
given time . The intent of section 7(3) is to confine each legislative body's
power to. enact laws which repeal or amend United Kingdom statutes
extending to Canada within exactly the same limits as confine that legislative body's power to enact laws generally. Bearing in mind that section
52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982, has validly prescribed some new
restrictions on the competence of the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the Provinces, it is clear from section 7(3) of the Statute of
Westminster that neither the Parliament nor the legislatures can escape
from those restrictions . The Parliament and the legislatures are bound by
section 52(3).
An attempt by the Parliament (for example) to amend section 6
(mobility rights) ofthe Constitution Act, 1982 (for example) would be met
with the, conclusive objection that section 52(3) of the Constitution Act,
1982 denies to the Parliament acting alone the competence to amend
section 6. Since section 6 is part of the Constitution of Canada, the only
legislative process which could amend section 6 is the combination of
legislative acts prescribed by section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982.36
An attempt by the Parliament to amend section 52(3) itself would be met
with exactly the same conclusive objection . Section, 52(3) is itself part of
the Constitution of Canada, and therefore section 52(3) denies to the
Parliament acting alone the competence to amend section 52(3). The only
legislative process which could amend section 52(3) is the combination of .
legislative acts prescribed by either section 38 or section 41(e) (I am not
sure which) . If we substitute a legislature for the Parliament in the foregoing examples, or if we change the provision of the Constitution Act,
1982, the answer will still be the same. The Parliament or a legislature can
do only those things which the Constitution of Canada, as amended by the
Constitution Act, 1982, authorizes the Parliament or a legislature to do.
This result in my opinion follows from the express language of section
7(3) of the Statute of Westminster. But even if section 7(3) did not exist I
would still reach exactly the same conclusion . The logic of limited legisla3s S .
38 requires resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons, and of the
legislative assemblies of two-thirds of the provinces having a combined population of fifty
per cent of the total population of all of the provinces. In addition, if the amendment
derogates from the legislative powers of the provinces, . (as the addition of a new right would
do), a province could "opt out" of the amendment under s. 38(3) .
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tive competence entails the conclusion that alaw which limits the powers of
a legislative body cannot be altered by that legislative body . For this
reason, the better view is that section 7(3) was not really necessary to
protect from domestic amendment limits on the competence of a Canadian
legislative body. 37 Limits on the competence of a Canadian legislative
body, such as those imposed by section 52(3) of the Constitution Act,
1982, cannot be amended unilaterally by that body for the same reason that
a man cannot lift himself by his own bootstraps .
I conclude that section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982 cannot be
repealed or amended by ordinary legislative action, and therefore that
section 52(3) is effective to entrench the "Constitution of Canada" of
which the Constitution Act, 1982, and therefore the Charter, is a part. The
Charter can be amended only by the procedures stipulated in section 38 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 . 38
III. Supremacy of Constitution Act, 1982 .
Is the Constitution Act, 1982 "supreme" in the sense that it will invalidate
(render ofno force or effect) inconsistent laws enacted by the Parliament or
a legislature? This question would arise if the Parliament or a legislature
made no attempt to enact an amendment of some provision of the Constitution Act, 1982, but enacted alaw which was inconsistent with the provision
of the Constitution Act, 1982 . In this situation, as a matter of logic, one of
the two inconsistent laws must prevail over the other. It is the provision of
the Constitution Act, 1982 which prevails over the federal or provincial
statute. This is so because section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982
provides that any law which is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution ofCanada (which, it will be recalled, includes the Canada Act
1982 and the Constitution Act, 1982) "is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect" . Section 52(1) is a restriction on the competence
of the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures just like section
52(3), and it is binding on those bodies for exactly the same reasons as were
given in the previous section of this article for section 52(3).
The same result may be reached by slightly different reasoning. When
a court is faced with an inconsistency between a provision of the Constitution Act, 1982 (or any other part of the Constitution of Canada) and a
statute (whether federal or provincial) it must resolve the inconsistency by
applying the law respecting such inconsistencies . That law is supplied by
section 52(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . That law is part of the
Constitution of Canada, and therefore by virtue of section 52(1) can only be
amended by the procedures laid down in Part V of the Constitution Act,
1982. The court cannot therefore hold that section 52(1) has been impliedly
repealed or amended by the enactment of an ordinary statute (whether
37
38

Wheare, op . cit., footnote 15, p. 69 ; Hogg, op . cit., footnote 5, p. 44 .
The requirements of s . 38 are summarized, supra, footnote 36 .
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federal or provincial) . The court must apply section 52(1) and hold that the
statute yields to the Constitution Act, 1982 .
I suppose that a faint argument could be made that section 52(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 is inconsistent with section 2(2) of the Statute of
Westminster. Section 2(2) of the Statute of Westminster provides that no
law of a Dominion "shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is
repugnant to . . . any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United
Kingdom" . Section 2(2) applies to provincial as well as federal laws by
virtue of section 7(2) . But, as noted earlier in this article, section 2(2) is
qualified by section 7(3), which restricts the powers of the Parliament of
Canada and the provincial legislatures "to the enactment of laws inrelation
to matters within the competence of the Parliament of Canada or of any of
the legislatures of the Provinces respectively" . When section 2(2) is read
with section 7(3), the apparent inconsistency between section 2(2) and
section 52(1) ofthe Constitution Act, 1982 disappears . As argued earlierin
this article, since section 52(1) creates a limitation on the powers of each
Canadian legislative body, it creates a rule which cannot be repealed or
amended by a Canadian legislative body . If I am wrong in this argument,
and there is inconsistency between section 2(2) of the Statute of Westminster and section 52(1) ofthe Constitution Act, 1982, then the inconsistency
would in any case be resolved by the doctrine of implied repea139 in favour
of the later enactment, which is of course section 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982. 4°
I conclude therefore that the supremacy clause of section 52(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 is effective to make the Constitution Act, 1982 (as
well as the other parts of the Constitution of Canada) supreme in the sense
that it will invalidate inconsistent laws enacted by the Parliament or a
legislature .
Conclusions
1 . The Constitution Act, 1982 has been validly enacted for Canadaby
the United Kingdom Parliament . This is so because the power over Canada
of the United Kingdom Parliament is sufficient to enact the Constitution
Act, 1982; and this is so whether or not the Constitution Act, 1982, or any
provision thereof, is properly characterized as a "repeal, amendment or
alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930" .
2 . The Constitution Act, 1982 is entrenched in the sense that it cannot
be repealed or amended except in compliance with the amending procedures prescribed by Part V ofthe Constitution Act, 1982. This is so because
Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (1974), pp . 174-175.
40 The doctrine of implied repeal wouldbe the relevant rule to resolve the inconsistency because both laws were enacted by the same body (the United Kingdom Parliament) and
both laws are within the phrase the "Constitution of Canada" (so that s. 52(1) cannot
resolve the inconsistency) .
39
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section 52(3) constitutes a restriction on the competence of the federal
Parliament and provincial legislatures from which they are powerless to
escape .
3. The Constitution Act, 1982 is supreme in the sense that any law
enacted by the federal Parliament or a provincial legislature which is
inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1982 is of no force or effect . This is
so because section 52(1) says it is so, and section 52(1) cannot be repealed
or amended except in compliance with the amending procedures prescribed
by Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
4. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, is therefore supreme.

